Election Fraud Solutions

Again, it is important to distinguish election fraud from voter fraud. Voter fraud can be remedied easily through the application of non-discriminatory Voter ID practices involving available identification technologies (such as two-factor identification) that could be distributed for free. Election fraud is more complex,

They key to addressing election fraud is to identify and terminate the avenues for such fraud to transpire.

  • A process would be developed whereby voter registration is confirmed via mail, email, text and/or phone at a fixed date prior to the election with a confirmation number for cross referencing each voter to his or her registration status as of that date
    • If a state permits late registration, the suspect pool would be far smaller than the entire pool of registered voters
    • Vote-By-Mail would not start until after such registration date, would require inclusion of the confirmation number, and would not be available to late registrants (who could either vote at the Board of Elections prior to Election Day of at the polls on Election day
    • This would dramatically reduce the need for provisional ballots
  • The number of poll locations should be predicated upon registered voter density and statistically predicted turnout
  • Election observers should be posted at the locations of central servers when electronic voting machines are being utilized
  • Statistical models should be used to trigger automatic audits when:
    • Vote-By-Mail results differ significantly from Election Day results
    • When pre-election, and in particular, post-election polls differ significantly from Election Day results
    • And when other anomalies (demographic or otherwise) appear within Vote-By-Mail and/or Election Day results that are outside any reasonable limits of statistical probability
  • All electronic voting machines must be certified and sealed prior to use (again with strict chain of custody protocols in place)
  • All ballots cast that clearly indicate the will of the voter should be counted
  • Imaging technologies should be utilized whenever possible to count and/or recount ballots
    • Such images should become part of the public record particularly for purposes of validating elections
  • Audits and recounts should be random
    • The Division of Elections should not receive advanced notification of which counties and/or precincts will be subject to audit or recount
    • A chain of custody must be strictly maintained with respect to all paper and electronically cast votes
  • Conflicts of interest between election machine manufacturers (and their software providers if different) and any party, campaign, candidate, or affiliate thereof should be banned by law
  • In the event that electronic voting cannot be properly monitored, it should be replaced with a paper ballot system that creates a physical record of the actual vote

See Rocky De La Fuente on the Reality of Election Fraud